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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
in all of its applications, and that today the fundamental issue
is the reasonableness under the circumstances of permitting one
to prosecute a suit against a non-domiciliary defendant, assum-
ing adequate notice and perhaps the appointment of an attorney
to represent the absentee. The writer believes it is eminently
reasonable to allow alimony suits in personam against non-domi-
ciliary defendants to be prosecuted in the plaintiff's state of
domicile. Having a spouse or ex-spouse in possible need in a
state is as much reason to consider the non-domiciliary subject to
in personam suit there, for the purpose of ascertaining whether
alimony is due, as is "doing business," "using the highways and
causing injury or damage," or the host of other criteria used in
other kinds of situations.7
On the other hand, the writer believes proceedings quasi in
rem are intrinsically inappropriate to determine alimony lia-
bility for the future. A quasi in rem suit presupposes a claim
resolvable in a money judgment, and a demand for alimony is
certainly reducible to that; but to permit this procedure in in-
stances in which the judgment cannot be executed completely
as soon as rendered leads to difficulties. As Professor Woody of
the Tulane Law School observed accurately in a note on de
Lavergne,8 for a quasi in rem judgment for future alimony to be
truly effective the judgment debtor would have to be forbidden
to regain control of the assets attached even if at the moment
not a single alimony installment were due. Professor Woody
apparently favors legislation adopting such a rule.9 The writer
politely dissents, believing that such a rule should be judged in
unreasonable restraint of one's use of his assets before he has
defaulted in his obligation.
CRIMINAL LAW
Frederick W. Ellis*
Dangerous Weapon
In State v. Levi' the court held that an unloaded and in-
7. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 86-92 (for a
summary treatment) and 93-139 (for greater detail) (1971). See also Ander-
son, Using Long-Arm Jurisdiction to Enforce Marital Obligations, 11 J. or
FAMILY L. 67 (1971).
8. Woody, A New Alimony Remedy?, 19 LA. B.J. 151 (1971).
9. Id. at 156.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 259 La. 591, 250 So.2d 751 (1971). For a different view on this case,
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operative gun employed in a robbery can be a "dangerous"
weapon. A requested special instruction to the contrary was
held to have been correctly denied. Another special instruction
relating to the consideration of danger to persons other than
the victim was sustained. The court followed State v. Johnston,2
an assault case. Perspective of the victim was deemed important:
Fear of the victim or bystanders would be likely to generate
violent reaction, so the weapon was dangerous in the manner
used; in addition, an unloaded gun could be used as a bludgeon.
Such reasoning is manifestly correct in the context of
assault, because one form of assault involves the placing of the
victim in apprehension of receiving a battery. Consequently, the
victim's fear of an unloaded gun either as a firearm or bludgeon
can quite reasonably be said to govern. The definitional context
of the crime adds meaning to the general definition of "dangerous
weapon." Robbery does not necessarily involve the use of actual
force, but may exist by the presence of "intimidation." Thus,
there exists a definitional context similar to assault. Both assault
and robbery can involve fear on the part of the victim. So from
purely exegetical reasoning, the court seems quite correct.
Justice Sanders, by excellent usage of "purpose" and "con-
text" aspects of the genuine construction rule of article 3,
reasoned further that punishment of armed robbery is designed
to maintain peace, not only through the prevention of violence
by the offender, but also by deterring the creation of situations
which would provoke deadly violence by victims, or bystanders,
see Note, 32 LA. L. Rmv. 158 (1971). The major fallacy of the attack there
made turns on the premise that article 2(3) requires actual danger to the
victim. Such an assumption is unwarranted by the "manner of use" test
and is contrary to the fact that a manner of use merely "calculated" to
produce death or great bodily harm is sufficient for an instrumentality to
be dangerous. There is no language in article 2(3) requiring that the danger
be to the victim. Cases cited in the student Note involved crimes In which
the victim's apprehension is not an element. Note, 32 LA. L. REv. 158, 159 n.7
(1971). Moreover, the cited opinions do not support a conclusion that actual
danger to the victim is important. On the "actual" factor, State v. Reynolds,
209 La. 455, 24 So.2d 818 (1945) plainly held that a dangerous weapon "is not
necessarily one that can or will produce death or great bodily harm."
State v. Murff, 215 La. 40, 39 So.2d 817 (1949) held that lying in wait with
devices which were dangerous to bus passengers and a driver, if used as
intended, was lying In wait with a dangerous weapon. The intended "victim"
of the attempt to commit aggravated criminal damage to the bus was the
bus owner, a corporation with no corporeal body to be harmed. The pas-
sengers and driver were analogous to bystanders.
Perhaps, in the final analysis, differences of opinion about Levi really
turn on one's judgment of whether an empty gun, used in a robbery, is
likely to create danger to others. The shots fired by Levi's victim spoke
loudly on this point.
2. 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1944).
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with resultant likelihood of danger to persons at the scene.
Either a broken or unloaded gun may provoke violent defense
as much as a loaded and directly dangerous real gun. Although
a toy gun was not involved, it would seem that a toy or imitation
gun could also be treated as a "dangerous weapon" under the
reasoning of the court, provided it was used in the manner of
a real loaded gun to intimidate.
Rape
In State v. Bolden,3 the court has followed dual trends dis-
cernible in prior decisions by stretching the concept of relevance
with respect to state of mind evidence in the prosecution context,
and restricting it in the defense context. These trends have
reached such extremes in dealing with evidence problems that
it seems appropriate to question whether the evidence rulings
have not de facto changed the substantive definitions of the
Code. A review of two earlier decisions illustrates the prior
development of these dual trends.
In a 1954 case, State v. Michel,4 the supreme court upheld
a prosecution objection to a remark by defense counsel related
to drunkenness as a defense to a charge of aggravated rape.
Its propriety depended on the theory that R.S. 14:15 (2) provides
that intoxication is a defense for crimes requiring specific crimi-
nal intent and that a prosecution for aggravated rape involves
such a crime. The court held that specific criminal intent is not a
necessary element of aggravated rape, distinguishing State v.
Ferrand,5 relied on by Michel's defense counsel, on the grounds
that Ferrand involved attempted rape, and that all attempt
crimes, under R.S. 14:27, require specific intent. Actually, the
crime charged was not attempted aggravated rape, but simply
aggravated rape, as in Michel. Attempted aggravated rape was
the verdict returned by the jury. Noting that such a verdict was
responsive to a charge of aggravated rape, the court in Ferrand
found that the prosecution's evidence of a prior offense by the
defendant was admissible to show intent. Of course, the very
same reasoning would have called for an opposite holding on
the intent problem in Michel, so the court's effort in Michel to
distinguish Ferrand was rather unconvincing. The only truly
3. 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970).
4. 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954).
5. 210 La. 394, 27 So.2d 174 (1946).
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distinguishing feature of these two cases is that in Michel the
evidence relating to subjective mental state would have bene-
fitted the defense and was held irrelevant; in Ferrand, it bene-
fitted the prosecution and was held relevant.
State v. Bolden combined the flexible judicial approach of
both earlier cases, holding in effect that evidence which would
logically tend to show the unquestionably relevant state of mind
of the complaining witness (consent to sexual relations),
because it would serve to impeach the complainant, is inadmis-
sible, but evidence of an unrelated alleged rape by the defendant
two years earlier is admissible. This writer's complaint with
the Bolden decision is directed to the patent unfairness of
excluding relevant evidence on the consent problem; it is not
against showing subjective knowledge or specific criminal intent
by use of evidence of prior similar criminal acts. Indeed, there
is ample jurisprudence and statutory law supporting the use of
prior similar criminal acts to show actual knowledge or specific
intent. Whether or not rape requires any intent element at all
is immaterial, since attempted rape is responsive and that crime
certainly requires specific intent.
In a crime with so severe a penalty as aggravated rape,6
it cannot be effectively urged that it does not require at least
a general intent.7 Consequently, the dissent of Justice Barham
in the Bolden case, to the extent it relies on the theory that rape
does not require intent, knowledge, or purpose, is less -convincing
than the major dissenting reasons given separately by him and
Justice Tate, which also lack force.
The reasoning of the dissenting justices is that evidence of
prior similar criminality is too relevant on the question of
criminal intent and is therefore irrelevant-i.e., it is prejudicially
pursuasive and violates the "great principle that a party is not
6. See State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957), reaff'g State v.
Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24, 30 (1955), which held "no crime can exist
without the combination of a criminal act and a criminal intent, or an evil
motive, or with a guilty knowledge of its consequences." This principle was
stated in the context of a crime with a serious penalty (narcotics possession)
and used in both cases to justify prosecution usage of evidence of prior
criminality.
7. See Askew v. State, 118 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1960). The Florida Supreme
Court held that the common law crime of rape, although no mention of
intent occurs in its definition, involves a general intent, which can be infer-
red from the act itself. Such an intent approach would seem correct in
Louisiana also. Of course, general intent usually involves a consideration
of whether the act implies the intent, under the objective test of whether
the offender doing an act "must have adverted" to the consequences.
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to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of
another." To this writer, the principle is not so "great" if it
blocks consideration of overt acts which plainly and logically
relate to the state of mind necessary to show guilt or innocence
of the crime charged; but it is only a general principle, never
intended as an all-embracing rule to exclude evidence of overt
acts that reasonably tend to show actual knowledge or intent, or
other relevant state of mind evidence. 8
The dissenting justices did not concern themselves with
the majority rejection or limitation of a defense right to attack
the chastity of the victim, but the subject is worthy of comment.
It is submitted that judicially created restrictions on the admis-
sibility of evidence of a crime, especially when such restrictions
effectively diminish a statutorily defined defense, is clearly
violative of the "purely statutory"9 scheme of substantive crim-
inal law which Louisiana is supposed to have. It is against
reason to be bound by old cases which recognize hearsay and
reputation as relevant evidence of lack of chastity, but ignore
direct evidence of actual acts of promiscuity as irrelevant to
the issue of whether the female may have been a person who
very likely consented. Under plain statutory policy, there should
be no doubt of the absence of the female's consent in order for
rape to be found. That policy is implicit in the requirement that
there be resistance to the utmost unless such resistance would
be futile, or incompentency prevents resistance.
Defense counsel in subsequent rape trials should make clear
that any defense evidence concerning the victim's chastity is not
offered to impugn her credibility; but independently of her
credibility, it is offered to show probability of consent, or mistaken
belief that consent was present. Cases cited by the court to sup-
port its exclusion of the evidence on an impeachment rationale
actually sustain admission of such evidence as relevant if not
used for impeachment.
Burglary
In State v. Thompson,10 in passing upon the materiality and
relevancy of evidence offered to corroborate testimony that a
theft had taken place, the court approved per curiam remarks
8. See State v. Reeves, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374 (1939).
9. See the Reporter's Comment to LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950).
10. 256 La. 1019, 240 So.2d 899 (1970).
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of the trial judge which could be construed as stating that the
fact of a theft having occurred is a necessary element for finding
commission of a burglary. It seems correct to hold that testi-
mony of the commission of the theft, after entering the premises,
is quite relevant to prosecution for burglary because it is evi-
dence of an intent to commit theft when entering. Such a holding
should not be misconstrued as suggesting that it is necessary
to show the actual commission of a theft. The plain language
of both article 60 and article 62 evidences that it is sufficient,
provided other requisites are present, to have an intent to commit
a theft upon entering for the crime of burglary to be consum-
mated.
Theft of Partnership Property
The much-criticized". opinion of State v. Peterson2 was
reversed in State v. Morales.'3 Noting that Peterson was ren-
dered by less than a full court, and at that, a closely divided
court, the supreme court correctly reviewed the law on partner-
ship to conclude that the word "another," as used in article 67
of the theft article, did include a partnership. This was based
upon the finding that a partnership constitutes a separate legal
entity in Louisiana. It follows that it is a "person or legal entity"
within the meaning of article 2(1). Consequently, a partner
may in fact steal from a partnership in which he is a member.
This decision seems correct as a matter of analysis of the letter
of the law and the purpose behind article 67 of broadening theft
to encompass all conceivable factual situations where there may
be actual stealing by whatever name.
The technical correctness of the reversal of the Peterson
decision does not necessarily mean that to permit indiscriminate
prosecution for theft in partnership situations is wise law. The
intimacy and informality of many partnership relations and the
consent involved is analogous to a sort of business "marriage."
Bitterness upon breaking up may lead to the misuse of the
criminal process whenever one partner thinks he has been
wronged by the other. Just as rape is impossible between marital
partners, perhaps theft ought to be deemed impossible between
11. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957
Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 18 LA. L. REv. 120 (1957).
12. 232 La. 931, 95 So.2d 608 (1957).
13. 256 La. 940, 240 So.2d 714 (1970).
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business partners. On the other hand, the existence of the part-
nership clearly should not be a license to steal. This is an
important area where wise judgment of prosecutors-or control
by the courts-will have to be exercised if the substantive law
is not to be put in need of restrictive repair.
Robbery
In State v. Montegut,14 the court clarified the definition of
"armed robbery" noting that, although the definition contained
in R.S. 14:64 did not itself employ the word "intent," an inten-
tional element is present in the crime. Noting that armed rob-
bery is defined as theft, plus the presence of other circumstances
defined in R.S. 14:64, the court made reference to the definition
of theft, which of course does require a specific criminal intent.
By this reasoning it justified evidence of other similar acts of
criminality as proof of the intent, under the much-used if not
abused rule that evidence of similar acts may be used to prove
intent.
Insanity
The particular facts of State v. Edwards5 were that an
eighteen-year-old boy who had about an eight-year-old mental
age, with an IQ of 59, was held to be able to understand the
nature of the charges against him and to assist counsel in his
defense. The problem was not one of a substantive defense of
insanity (although that defense was also unsuccessfully made),
but rather the capacity of the boy to stand trial. But it is evident
that the courts would not treat the substantive problem with
any greater understanding of the capacity, or rather the inca-
pacity, of marginal mental retardates.
Edwards may indeed be the law on insanity, as a special
concurring opinion by Justice Tate noted pointing to established
precedent. However, the shocking facts of the exceedingly
limited mentality of a defendant who was forced to stand trial
raise serious questions as to the sanity of a system of justice
which in the twentieth century allows persons with seven to
eight-year-old mental ages to stand trial, probably without the
benefit of a substantive defense of insanity, and be fully crim-
inally responsible under objective rules designed for the famous
14. 257 La. 665, 243 So.2d 791 (1971).
15. 257 La. 707, 243 So.2d 806 (1971).
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"reasonable man" of the law. It is time for organizations like
the Louisiana Association for Retarded Children, the Louisiana
Mental Health Association, and others concerned with the wel-
fare of the mentally disabled, mentally deficient, or the mentally
ill to note the procedural and substantive nuances of criminal
insanity problems and, as Justice Tate intimated ought to be
done, to persuade the legislature to undertake serious reform
of the whole field of insanity in criminal law.
In State v. Square1 6 the court was faced with basically the
same legal problem. The particular facts of the alleged incom-
petence of the defendant were not fully stated, but the case is
interesting for the clarification of the point that low-grade or
subnormal intelligence, although not determinative of the capac-
ity to stand trial, is a factor to be considered and is relevant
to an inquiry as to the competency to stand trial.
Concealed Weapons
In In re Ogletree,17 a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the
court considered whether the minor's act in carrying a pistol in
his waistband constituted violation of the concealed weapon
statute, R.S. 14:95(1). The only prior Louisiana judicial inter-
pretations of the meaning of "concealment" indicated that the
partial concealment would constitute concealment. An exactly
opposite result was reached by the court of appeal holding that
the object must be fully hidden from view in order to con-
stitute concealment.
This writer is of the opinion that neither the old pre-Code
jurisprudence, rejected in Ogletree, nor the Ogletree approach
is sound. The problem is whether there has been an intentional
concealment. If a part of the weapon is openly displayed, such
open display is hardly consistent with an intent to conceal.
If a part is subject to view, not through an intention for it to
be openly displayed but merely by virtue of sloppy conceal-
ment, then it seems there may be intentional concealment even
though there is not full concealment. These are jury questions
and there ought not be any simplistic rule designed to govern
both the rural outdoorsman and the city street roamer by so
16. 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971).
17. 244 So.2d 288 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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mechanistic a standard as that of whether the weapon was
partially or fully concealed.
Narcotics
In State v. Barnes,18 Justice Barham rendered a dissent
pointing out that all of the cases which had read in the require-
ment of guilty knowledge or intent in connection with narcotics
statute violations "did so as a basis for allowing the State to
introduce evidence of the defendant's prior or subsequent con-
victions or other similar acts or offenses from which could be
inferred his guilty knowledge. . . ."19 He then complained
strongly about the refusal of the court to hold that a special
instruction should have been given, as requested, to unequiv-
ocally inform the jury that guilty knowledge is an essential
element for the crime of possession of narcotics. On rehearing,
which again affirmed the conviction, Justice Tate dissented,
strongly complaining about this failure to afford the defendant
the benefit of state of mind rules.20 This dissent reinforces the
view that "evidence" decisions have unduly modified substantive
criminal law and effectively caused the definitions of crimes and
defenses to be different for the prosecution and defense.21
MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Leila 0. Schroeder*
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The Louisiana Employment Security Law is designed "to
provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining
purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences
of poor relief assistance."' The provisions of the statute are
liberally interpreted to give the greatest effect to the intent of
this social legislation.2
18. 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1971).
19. Id. at 1034, 245 So.2d at 165.
20. Id. at 1048, 245 So.2d at 171.
21. See text accompanying notes 3-11 supra for a discussion concerning
the history of the jurisprudence, recently followed in State v. Bolden, show-
ing that the Louisiana Supreme Court holdings on state of mind evidence
must be taken in the context of whether this evidence benefits the prosecu-
tion or the defense. State v. Barnes also makes this point.
*Assistant Professor of Finance, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 23:1471 (1950).
2. Smith v. Brown, 147 So.2d 452 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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